Commentary: Threat of influence operations in Singapore is undefined but ever present

The challenge of this approach is coordinating efforts across multiple agencies and involving the public and private sectors to achieve the desired outcomes. The Singapore government has already demonstrated the willingness to deploy some of these measures, and the country’s small size enables it to adopt a whole-of-government approach to national threats.

A second approach mooted in Riga was to take a more offensive stance against adversaries rather than a defensive or passive one. This was understandably favoured by many NATO and European representatives who had experienced first-hand the actions of an adversary such as Russia in the four-year-long war in Ukraine. 

This approach might prove problematic for a country like Singapore, which is not under threat from a clear and present danger in the form of a specific adversary. Indeed, the country’s preference for a principled approach underpinned by diplomacy and mutually beneficial relations with international partners might render offensive actions incongruent, even in the greyer information space.

A more complicated discussion revolves around creating a universally accepted code governing information or influence operations akin to the Law of Armed Conflict, Geneva Conventions of 1949. Absent such a framework, and any rule-abiding nation such as Singapore might struggle to greenlight offensive operations on any scale.