Commentary: Comparing the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to Hormuz is a fallacy

The Cooperative Mechanism, established in 2007 by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and supported by other regional and international users, is a prime example. It envisages that the littoral states bear primary responsibility as coastal states to govern the waterway in areas such as navigational safety, while external parties provide financial and technical support.

Another initiative, the Malacca Straits Patrols, was promulgated in the wake of a scourge of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the waterway back in the early 2000s. Since then, the Malacca Straits Patrols have been instrumental in suppressing lawlessness in the waterway and demonstrated the ability of Southeast Asian countries, despite their differences, to jointly tackle a common security challenge. 

The resilience of these governance architectures rests on more than formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. It is also sustained by trust networks built through decades of repeated interaction – exercises, patrols, professional exchanges, crisis coordination and routine day-by-day engagement – between naval officers, coastguard personnel, maritime administrators, diplomats, analysts and shipping stakeholders. Such relationships facilitate rapid communication during incidents and reduce the risk of miscalculation – a form of institutional capital with no parallel in the Hormuz context.