It’s a two-horse race for AI crown. Where does that leave Singapore?

It’s a two-horse race for AI crown. Where does that leave Singapore?


The AI industry is and will remain a two-horse race. Only the United States and China each have the talent and market size to propel continued production and advancement of AI models, which the rest of us will use. The US has the added advantage of abundant risk capital while China’s strengths lie in hardware manufacture and state support.

Both are determined to win this race, including by shutting others out, as shown by the US blocking exports of advanced Nvidia semiconductors to China, and China blocking Meta’s acquisition of Singapore-headquartered Manus.

This fierce competition is not simply one of geopolitical rivalry. It is driven also by the structure of the AI industry itself, which in both countries is highly concentrated in a few mega corporations surrounded by a cluster of start-ups. This reflects the industry’s “winner-takes-all” nature, in which firstcomer advantages, scale and network effects mean early movers capture the entire market.

In the US, AI “hyperscalers” Google, Microsoft, Amazon and Meta are investing heavily in their own in-house AI models, and in OpenAI and Anthropic, while start-ups draw capital from venture capital and private equity funds. In China, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent are the big players, while independent labs like DeepSeek and Zhipu are mainly funded by state and local government entities and subject to state industrial policy.

Both countries also have disadvantages that could slow development of their respective AI industries. In the US, a popular backlash is gathering steam, as polls show a majority of Americans viewing AI negatively. There are growing calls and some local policies to limit data centre construction and youth social media use. Owners of intellectual property are legally challenging the use of their data to train AI models. Under-regulation increases risks that slow deployment, while monopolisation constrains entrepreneurship and innovation, and immigration restrictions deprive the industry of top talent.

AI entrepreneurship, adoption and innovation could also be curtailed in China, by censorship and over-regulation, such as state restrictions on worker layoffs and on foreign ownership and sales (which limit the wealth accumulation that incentivises entrepreneurs).

In both countries, the very speed deemed essential for technology advancement and market domination may impose brakes, as expansion drives up capital costs for producers and consumers, and human intervention costs increase to curb excess proliferation, coordinate deployment, correct errors, contain “slop” and retrain constantly in the face of rapid obsolescence.

This industry structure suggests that there will be few opportunities for Singapore to occupy strategic niches in the AI global value chain, as the multinational offshoring of previous technological eras will not happen this time. Geopolitics imposes further limits, with both the US and Chinese governments jealously guarding their home-grown technology and fearful that the other will use AI against them. This means that Singapore can jump on the bandwagon of only one horse, since neither will want to stable with the other; it will likely have to be the American horse.

Chinese companies do not need Singapore, even though it could be one of many convenient conduits for them to enter or acquire technology from more restrictive third markets.

For Singapore, engaging with Chinese firms would preclude more extensive engagement with US companies. Its openness to capital, talent and labour from China could deter American firms already worried about technology and talent leakage among themselves, which they pre-empt by offering stratospheric pay packages that impose “golden handcuffs” on key employees at the home office. Heightened attention to “Singapore-washing” by both the US and China, and Singapore’s unavoidable reliance on imported talent, will add to reluctance to locate AI model-building activities here.

That said, given its size, Singapore does not have the capacity to build general-purpose AI foundation models; nor does it need to. Large Language Models (LLMs) also enable the rapid development of localised and customised AI applications, and Singapore could leverage LLM capabilities to build domain- and region-specific applications and services.




Read Full Article At Source

Share. Save. Don't Miss The Buzz: XFacebookRedditLINETelegramWhatsAppGmail